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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
INTERDEPENDENCIES IN CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT: RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES 
by 
Rimi Zakaria 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Sumit Kundu, Co-Major Professor 
Professor William Newburry, Co-Major Professor 
A substantial amount of work in the field of strategic management has attempted 
to explain the antecedents and outcomes of organizational learning. Though multinational 
corporations simultaneously engage in various types of tasks, activities, and strategies on 
a regular basis, the transfer of organizational learning in a multi-task context has largely 
remained underexplored in the literature. To inform our understanding in this area, this 
dissertation aimed at synthesizing findings from two parallel research streams of 
corporate development activities: strategic alliances and acquisitions. Structured in the 
form of two empirical studies, this dissertation examines: 1) the strategic outcomes of 
alliance experience of previously allying partners in terms of subsequent acquisition 
attempts, and 2) the performance implications of prior alliance experience for 
acquisitions. The first study draws on the relational view of inter-organizational 
governance to explain how various deal-specific and dyadic characteristics of a 
partnership relate to partnering firms’ post-alliance acquisition attempts. This model 
theorizes on a variety of relational mechanisms to build a cohesive theory of inter-
viii 
 
organizational exchanges in a multi-task setting where strategic alliances ultimately lead 
to a firm’s decision to commit further resources. The second study applies organizational 
learning theory, and specifically examines whether frequency, recency, and relatedness of 
different dimensions of prior alliances, beyond the dyad-level experience, relate to an 
acquirer’s superior post-acquisition performance. The hypotheses of the studies are tested 
using logistic and ordinary least square regressions, respectively. Results analyzed from a 
sample of cross-border alliance and acquisition deals attempted (for study I) and/or 
completed (for study II) during the period of 1991 to 2011 generally support the theory 
that relational exchange determines acquiring firms’ post alliance acquisition behavior 
and that organizational routines and learning from prior alliances influence a future 
acquirer’s financial performance. Overall, the empirical findings support our overarching 
theory of interdependency, and confirm the transfer effect of learning across these 
alternate, yet related corporate strategies of alliance and acquisition.  
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INTERDEPENDENCIES IN CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT: RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES 
 
DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
Firms seeking to strategically combine their resources with those of other firms often 
follow two popular alternative governance structures: strategic alliances or acquisitions (Wang 
and Zajac, 2007). Decades of research by strategic management researchers suggest 
substantial degree of similarity in the factors of antecedents, processes, and outcomes in both 
alliance and acquisition activities. Numerous studies (Arend, 2004; Porrini; Wang and Zajac) 
expressed that these parallel firm activities are potentially interdependent.  Despite this 
potential interdependence, until very recently, strategic management literature addressed 
alliance and acquisition activities as two discrete or parallel streams (Reur and Arino, 2007). 
Only a handful of very recent studies (Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz, and Croson, 2012; Zaheer, 
Hernandez, and Banerjee, 2010) indicated that these two corporate development activities may 
have substantial overlap. In an endeavor to seek their inter-relationships, this dissertation takes 
an integrative approach and proposes the two empirical studies synthesizing both alliance and 
acquisition research.  
Strategic alliances are arrangements between two or more independent firms that 
choose to carry out a project or to jointly manage in a specific business area by 
coordinating the necessary resources and capabilities rather than either operating 
independently or sharing their operations (Dussauge and Garrette, 1997; Dussauge, 
Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000). Whereas acquisition activities are those deals where a firm 
purchases a second firm – though the medium of exchange (e.g., cash, stock) and degree 
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of ownership of this purchase may vary (e.g., buying a small equity, controlling share, 
majority share, full ownership). According to King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004), the 
most general theoretical motivation for firms engaging in M&A activity is the firms’ 
pursuit of creating synergy (i.e., the notion that the sum of merging two firms is greater 
than their individual parts).  
 
 This dissertation is structured in terms of two empirical studies addressing two 
interrelated, yet distinct sets of hypotheses. The rest of this document therefore bifurcates into 
two standalone articles. Before we proceed to the articles, the following is an overarching 
framework that represents the research models of this dissertation (illustrated by Figure 1: 
Overarching Framework of the Dissertation):   
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STUDY I:  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DYADIC AND DEAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
PARTNERSHIP AND POST-ALLIANCE ACQUISITION ATTEMPT  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the competencies and learning processes relating alliance and merger & 
acquisition (M&A) activities are two well developed bodies of research in strategic 
management, the potential interdependencies of learning across these corporate activities 
have been underexplored (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Zeira and Newburry, 1999; Newburry 
and Zeira, 1997). Arend (2004) expressed that alliances and M&As can be considered 
related corporate activities and, therefore, are worthy of studying collectively. In fact, 
prior research suggests that a substantial number of strategic alliances go through post-
alliance governance adjustments and other dynamic changes (Reuer and Zollo, 2005; 
Reuer, Zillo, and Singh, 2002; Reuer and Zollo (2000), including ending in M&A 
(Kogut, 1991; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Garette and Dussauge, 2000). The phenomenon of 
using alliances as a screening tactic for acquisitions is also documented in the literature 
(e.g., Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Nanda and Williamson, 1995). It is still largely 
under-explained as to what factors or mechanisms result in such a post-alliance M&A 
attempt in an interfirm partnership. In an attempt to integrate these two bodies of 
research, we examine the underlying factors in strategic alliances that may explain a 
firm’s post-alliance M&A strategy with an alliance partner. Drawing upon organizational 
learning theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988) and the relational 
view (Dyer and Singh 1998 Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) of 
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interfirm partnerships, the theoretical model of our study examines how organizational 
learning from prior partnering experience in alliance activities and other partnership-
specific factors (Gulati, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999 and 2002; 
Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006) associate with a focal firm’s post-alliance 
strategy.  More specifically, we seek to examine how deal-specific and dyadic factors of 
an alliance relate to a firm’s future M&A strategy. 
Given that alliances and acquisitions involve two or more firms creating an inter-
organizational context of transactions, analyzing only focal-firm characteristics to 
understand this dyadic phenomenon provides us with a one-sided and incomplete view of 
a dyadic phenomenon (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Taking individual firm characteristics 
makes us underestimate the relational aspects of two firms’ preferences and interactions 
that are critical for determining the process of their resource combination (Zajac and 
Olsen, 1993). This narrow analysis is likely to be misleading or at least incomplete when 
our outcome variable may be a byproduct of the said partnership. Therefore, we are 
interested in exploring how endogenous factors to a dyadic relationship may relate to a 
focal firm’s post-alliance strategic action to acquire a partner.  
The rest of this paper is organized in the following sections. First, I review the 
literature on organizational learning and the relational view with particular focus on 
strategic alliance and M&A activities. Second, I formulate a conceptual model and 
develop a wide range of hypotheses pertaining to dyadic and deal specific aspects to 
establish a relationship between an alliance agreement and a focal firm’s potential M&A 
attempt. Third, a research design is presented elaborating on the sample, variables, 
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measures, and statistical techniques. The concluding section articulates some potential 
limitations, originality, and theoretical contributions of the study. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKDROP: STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND ACQUISITIONS 
Partner selection in inter-firm alliance and target selection in acquisition contexts 
has been a well-established stream of research in strategic management. Numerous 
studies have studied the determinants of firms seeking to join partnerships and acquire 
other firms as two parallel research streams. However, in this study, we consider an 
interdependent model, where we focus on only those acquisition attempts where the 
acquiring and target firms had a prior alliance with each other, which likely influenced 
their decision to undertake an acquisition deal. 
Alliance Preceding Acquisition  
Prior work suggests that strategic alliances sometimes end in acquisitions (Kogut, 
1991; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Garette and Dussauge, 2000). Consistent with these 
empirical findings, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 247) noted that in many cases, 
collaboration serves as the first productive step toward understanding the environment, 
market, or industry before an acquisition. Bowman and Hurry (1993) have also suggested 
that firms can use prior alliances as intermediate strategic options to eventually acquire a 
partner. However, none of the above-mentioned studies examined which factors induce 
post-alliance acquisition attempts. Few theoretical arguments (besides very recent 
exceptions, e.g., Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banarjee, 2010) have 
been proposed to guide research on how relational characteristics of firm dyads interact 
to impact the partnering firms’ post-alliance strategies in related corporate development 
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activities. But, it is evident from the nature of alliance and acquisition deals that there 
seems to be a natural increase in commitment of firm resources from alliances (i.e., less 
resource intensive) to acquisitions (i.e., more resource intensive in terms of holding a 
majority share of equity). Therefore, we attempt to address these evocative gaps in the 
strategy literature by examining how firms’ dyadic experience and exchange associate 
with their post-alliance acquisition attempts. 
Distinction between Alliance and Acquisition 
Broadly speaking, strategic alliances are arrangements between two or more 
independent firms that choose to carry out a project or operate in a specific business area 
by coordinating the necessary skills and resources jointly rather than either operating 
independently or sharing their operations (Dussauge and Garrette, 1997; Dussauge, 
Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000). Whereas acquisitions are those deals where a firm 
purchases a second firm, though the form (e.g., cash, stock) and degree of ownership 
(e.g., controlling share, majority share, full ownership) of such purchase may vary. 
According to King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004), the most general theoretical 
motivation for firms engaging in M&A activity is the firms’ pursuit of creating synergy 
(i.e., the notion that the sum of merging two firms is greater than their individual parts).  
Strategic alliances can take different forms: non-equity contractual alliances (CA), 
minority-equity alliances (EA), and joint ventures (JV), where the latter one involves 
establishing a formal legal entity.  A JV or EA allows partners to share equity control, 
while in a non-equity CA the partners neither share equity control as in a minority-equity 
investment nor create a new organizational entity as is done in a JV. Furthermore, even in 
JVs that involve equity investment, the determinants of distribution of ownership among 
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partners remain inconclusive (Cuypers and Martin, 2010).  In a recent study, Phene and 
Tallman (2012) found that coordination characteristics in an alliance and some contextual 
factors influence alliance formation and the level of equity investment. Evidently, given 
the nature of these governance modes, it can be a muddy task to definitively distinguish 
strategic alliance deals from acquisitions. In the interest of this study, an equity cut-off is 
used for only for non-JVs to differentiate between alliances and acquisitions. We 
followed the distinction adopted by Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banarjee (2010). They 
considered a deal to be an acquisition if an acquiring firm obtained a majority of the 
target’s equity (50.1%); any other types of equity or non-equity deals, including JVs, are 
included as alliance deals. 
Relevant Theoretical Frameworks 
Relational Mechanisms 
One dimension of alliance relationships that has received considerable empirical 
attention in the last few decades is the extent to which firms are similar or related to their 
alliance partners (Saxton, 1997, Hull, Slovinsky, Wharton, and Azimi, 1988; Westney, 
1988) and how this influences alliance outcomes.  In this research stream, scholars have 
indicated the importance of firm-specific, partner-specific, and relational attributes that 
make an inter-firm alliance successful. Within this theoretical tradition, the relational 
view of inter-firm relationship (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Hatch, 2006) suggests 
that value creation in an inter-organizational context is contingent upon the existence of 
effective relational mechanisms, such as relation-specific investments, knowledge 
sharing, complementary partner resources, and routine-building. Furthermore, Lane and 
Lubatkin (1998) coined the term relative absorptive capacity, defined as the ability of a 
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focal firm to recognize and assimilate valuable information and knowledge from a 
partner. Relative absorptive capacity has been found to be an important prerequisite for 
value creation in an inter-firm exchange.  
Organizational Learning  
Scholars of organizational learning have long theorized that corporate strategies 
are influenced by activities that stem from: a) organizational routines based on the 
interpretation of the past (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982), b) history-
dependent actions that provide feedback about outcomes (Lindblom, 1959; Steinbruner, 
1974; Greve, 2003) and c) relations between organizational outcomes and future actions 
based on those outcomes (Simon, 1955; Siegel 1957; Olsen, 1976).  
The widely prevalent term "routine" includes the rules, procedures, conventions, 
practices, strategies, and technologies that are adopted by organizations and through 
which they conduct their day-to-day operations. It may also include norms, belief 
structures, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that strengthen, 
elaborate, and contradict the formal routines. Routines may originate at the level of an 
individual cognition or behavior, but based on their frequency of use, they may gradually 
become independent of the individual actors who execute them, and expand up to the 
boundary of an organizational and inter-organizational context. However, it is important 
to recognize that under certain circumstances, organizational experience and routines are 
not conserved in their entirety. Knowledge, learning, and routines may disappear from an 
organization’s active memory and future reinforcement because of limits on 
organizational control, lack of legitimacy of a practice, personnel turnover, different 
types of distance within the organizational boundary, rate of learning, etc. 
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Over the last several decades, a considerable body of research has suggested that 
organizational learning based on prior experience drives important future strategic actions 
(March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963, Nelson and Winter, 1982).  At the core 
of this argument is the assumption that firms may be able to improve their future 
behavior relying on the experience, outcomes, and feedback received from past actions 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Miller and Friesen, 1980). The nature and scope of their 
experiences enables firms to improve routine-based learning and enhances the likelihood 
of the routine/learning being used in future relevant activities.  Given that organizational 
learning and feedback are a crucial part of firms’ future strategic behaviors, we consider 
the strategic performance implications for similar corporate actions.  
The view that learning stems from feedback, grounded in the Carnegie school of 
thought (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963), emphasizes the role of organizational outcomes 
from prior actions and suggests that these outcomes determine a firm’s future behavior 
(Greve, 2003). Some theoretical work in the learning tradition has implied that routines 
and feedback work together to shape and reinforce firms’ future behavior (Levitt and 
March, 1988). Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan (2006) have examined the combined 
effect of routines and feedback based on prior acquisition experience, in the context of 
the US commercial banking industry. Building on these notions of routines and feedback 
from previous organizational actions, this study seeks to demonstrate that an alliance 
partner’s likelihood of a future acquisition of its partner is positively related to the nature 
of alliance experience with the target firm immediately prior to the acquisition.  
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Considering the nature and focus of our research questions, we formulate the 
following five hypotheses. The relationships proposed in these hypotheses are illustrated 
in the following conceptual model (Figure 2):        
 
Role of Deal Characteristics in Building Relational Mechanisms 
According to the seminal piece of Levitt and March (1988), even within a 
consistent and accepted set of routines for actions and practices, only part of an 
organization’s memory is likely to be evoked for its future application. In this case, the  
recency of a certain organizational experience is very critical. Therefore, we build on this 
premise that in the context of a post-alliance acquisition attempt, the most valuable 
aspects of experience an acquiring firm can gain are from its partnering experience with 
the target firm. Assuming that there is a connection between the alliance deal and post-
alliance strategic actions of a firm with its alliance partner, we propose that positive or 
negative dynamics of inter-organizational experience and reciprocity would further 
signify the future outcome of a partnership. We believe that the following steps 
summarize this relational mechanism. First, alliance deals provide a focal firm with the 
opportunity to receive partner-specific learning, feedback, and to build partner-specific 
routines. Second, when a focal firm’s post alliance experience/exchanges with its partner 
are satisfactory, it validates the focal firm’s assumptions that they have developed a 
certain level of competencies required to successfully work together (Haleblian, Kim, and 
Rajagopalan, 2006). Finally, it elevates the confidence of a focal firm’s decision-makers 
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to undertake a post-alliance acquisition attempt based on both the performance feedback 
and partner specific experience from the alliance deal.  
Alliances and acquisitions being complex events, the causal relationship between 
performance and the factors contributing to the performance may not very be clear 
(Sirower, 1997).  Therefore, learning from the performance feedback from an alliance 
requires a focal firm to carry out a meaningful evaluation of the performance (Haleblian, 
Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006), beyond merely the financial measure of performance. Such 
an evaluation may appear to be a difficult task when varying performance levels of 
multiple activities may demand time and cognitive effort from the decision makers. 
Therefore, we argue that different transaction- and relation-specific factors become 
important to decision-makers as they consider post-alliance strategic choices. Behavioral 
theorists have suggested that under such ambiguous conditions, decision makers tend to 
rely on the most recent information to reduce their cognitive burdens and simplify 
information processing (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Steiner & Rain, 1989). Following 
these lines of reasoning, we believe that partner-specific and dyadic conditions of the 
most recent alliance deal are likely to result in a positive or negative evaluation of an 
interfirm relationship.  In other words, reciprocity, mutuality, and emerging dynamics of 
an inter-organizational relationship would play the role of a precursor to the success of a 
higher level of post-partnership resource commitment. Accordingly, in the following 
sections we identify a number of deal specific and relational characteristics supported by 
the extant literature that are central to studying this collective phenomenon of alliances 
leading to acquisitions. 
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 Prior Partnership between Firms 
Some scholars suggested that at the individual firm level, a firm’s experience with 
various prior partners contributes to its relational capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Gulati, 1999, 2007; Kale et al., 2002; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). Such experience 
contributes to the development of alliance management routines that assist firms in 
partner selection, the choice of appropriate governance mechanisms, and the effective 
management of inter-organizational relationships. These relational capabilities, in turn, 
are likely to enhance value creation in subsequent alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000).  
Firm dyads with repeated transactions develop relational absorptive capacity 
(Wang and Zajac, 2007). Experience in each inter-organizational deal is important to the 
creation of routines and capabilities, because each successive deal carries intrinsic value, 
creates experience, generates feedback, and provides information about a potential target 
firm’s capabilities (Arikan and McGahan, 2010). These inter-organizational mechanisms 
typically precede partners’ investments in relation specific assets and knowledge-sharing 
routines as well as reliance on complementary resources and trust-based governance 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). The emergence of such relational mechanisms depends on the 
interactions with partners (Gulati and Sytch, 2007, 2008; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 
1998), and thus is tied to the history of prior relationships with specific partners. 
Consequently, benefits that can derive from partnering experience are less fungible across 
alliances with other partners (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). For instance, inter-firm 
trust with a given partner does not imply trust of another partner; knowledge sharing 
routines that economize on transaction costs with a certain partner may not be applicable 
in relationships with other partners; and mutually agreed upon conflict resolution 
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mechanisms that are applied in recurrent alliances with the same partner are not 
necessarily applicable in all other alliances (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). Therefore, 
multiple types of experience benefits are available only in recurrent alliances with the 
same partners.  
Prior studies suggested that at the dyadic level, the partnering experience of two 
firms may reduce opportunistic behavior in subsequent alliances between them by 
guiding partner selection decisions and by fostering mutual trust, reciprocity, informal 
obligation, and loyalty (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Wang, 2003; Kogut, 1989; Park and 
Kim, 1997). Consequently, partners are more willing to commit critical resources (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Zajac and Olsen, 1993) and cut back on the control and monitoring 
costs in such recurrent alliances (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Williamson, 1985). Experience 
accumulated in recurrent alliances with the same partners also contributes to the capacity 
of partners to resolve inter-firm conflicts (Kale et al., 2000; Simonin, 1997), reduces 
transactional uncertainties, and enhances the predictability of alliance success. The above 
discussion altogether enables us to deduce that alliance deals are generally more 
satisfactory to partnering firms when agreements involve recurrent partnerships, which 
may invoke the intent in the partners to pool resources for greater integration through a 
majority-share acquisition. Given the previous lines of reasoning, we expect that prior 
alliance experience with a partner will have a positive effect on the likelihood of a future 
acquisition attempt. Thus, we predict the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Prior partnership agreement between a dyad of alliance partners 
would increase the likelihood of a post-alliance acquisition attempt between the same 
partners. 
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 Multi-nationality 
 In inter-organizational relationships between firms from different countries, the 
dyad of the firms typically face higher levels of geographic, economic, cultural, psychic, 
administrative and political distance (also collectively referred to as institutional distance) 
vis-à-vis a uni-national setting (Verbeke, 2010). A very widely accepted body of research 
building on the contributions of North (1990), Scott (1995), Kostova (1999), and Peng 
(2008) theorize on the complexities created by institutional differences that underlie 
cross-border strategic alliance (Phene and Tallman, 2012; Tallman and Phene, 2007; 
Gulati and Singh, 1998) or merger & acquisition settings (Dikova, Sahib, and 
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Meyer and Altenborg, 2008; Wang and Zajac, 2007, Morosini, 
Shane, Singh, 1998). In view of the literature, we argue that creation of relational 
mechanism in a dyadic context takes substantial effort on the part of partnering firms and 
imposes further costs on their exchange process. An alliance with a partner from the same 
national context (even after recognizing sub-national differences) provides firms with a 
more stable and consistent learning context. In such a context, experience is accumulated 
more efficiently, resulting in lower learning costs, and exhibiting faster learning 
compared to an unfamiliar environment where communication and collaboration takes 
greater effort (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009).   
 It is also believed that home country differences in a relationship dyad may 
become more complex than micro-level differences (e.g., differences in organizational 
culture) (Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh, 1996). These differences may entail issues ranging 
from problems with “evaluating information on research output and productivity, 
calculating hypothetical synergies and formulating optimistic business plans based on 
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increased innovation capacity, towards actually trying to make the acquisition [an inter-
firm collaboration] work by bundling assets and capabilities in practice” (Verbeke, 2010: 
41). These distance components that are embedded in national differences between the 
host countries of firms, therefore, may deteriorate inter-firm exchanges and complicate 
the process of building common routines and relational capabilities in an alliance. 
Furthermore, higher institutional distance underlying national difference makes it more 
difficult for partnering firms to achieve optimal commonality in their dominant logics (A 
dominant logic reflects “[firms’] entrenched habitual modes of functioning based on prior 
successes and failures and the strategic contingencies they have had to face in the past” 
(Cote, Langley, and Pasquero, 1999). However, efficient and effective integration of an 
acquired company with its acquirer usually requires the latter to institutionalize at least 
some of its routines in a post-acquisition integration (Verbeke, 2010; Verbeke and 
Kenworthy, 2008). 
Given such an institutionally challenging scenario of inter-firm exchange, 
managers of a focal firm are likely to have a negative evaluation of a successful post-
acquisition success with a partner in such a strategic alliance, and to not consider a post-
alliance acquisition. As a result, we anticipate that national and regional differences 
between partner firms may reduce a focal firm’s motivation to go for a deeper level of 
integration with its partner: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Differences in national origin (i.e., a cross-border deal) of alliance 
partner firm dyads will decrease the likelihood of their post-alliance acquisition attempt. 
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 Ownership Type Difference  
Increasingly global, dynamic, and competitive environments have encouraged 
firms to rely on external sources for supplementary and complementary resources and 
capabilities (Santoro and Chakrabarti, 2002). As a result, interfirm relationships are being 
formed between and among various types of large multidivisional, subsidiaries, public, 
private, and not-for-profit organizations. But, these different types of organizational 
ownership forms are distinct from one another due to their diverse pools of resources, 
knowledge, capabilities, ownership, management, and governance structures (Harrison et 
al., 2001).  
Evidently therefore, partnering with organizations of different governance 
structures and purposes would pose a greater challenge for partnering firms in terms of 
resources and knowledge sharing, effective and efficient communication, development of 
organizational routines, and so on. For instance, publicly owned companies, more so than 
privately owned ones, are expected to comply with a variety of national and international 
regulations. At a broader level, dissimilar organizations in terms of ownership variety are 
likely to have different goals, decision-making processes, and organizational systems that 
may cause communication and coordination difficulties in inter-organizational settings, 
resulting in increased transaction costs. It may even cause reduction in overall value 
creation potential from an alliance deal and create issues with post-alliance integration 
(Jiang, Tao, and Santoro, 2010). Wang and Zajac (2007) found that considering the 
potential for synergy creation, more similar firms may prefer acquisitions over alliances 
due to greater value-creation opportunities. They further argued that similar firms that 
have greater duplication in routines and resources may be able to eliminate many 
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redundancies by pooling their resources together. As a result, the combined firm, i.e., an 
acquisition, is likely to be more efficient (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dussauge, Garrette, and 
Mitchell, 2000). Moreover, when two firms are similar, organizational operations and 
transactions are more efficient within the boundary of a firm vis-à-vis in an inter-
organizational relationship, which is suggestive of greater realization of synergies 
(Garrette and Dussauge, 2000). 
As a result, we argue that an alliance deal involving parties of different ownership 
structures reduces the potential for a higher partnership satisfaction between the partners, 
and may complicate the routine and capability development process, ceteris paribus. The 
difficulties in mutuality and reciprocity during the duration of an alliance are likely to 
have a negative effect on the confidence of decision makers as to whether a greater level 
of integration and commitment could be more beneficial in the form of an acquisition – 
especially given a more legally binding context of an acquisition deal. Therefore, we 
predict the following effect stemming from the difference in partnering firms’ ownership 
types: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Difference in the organizational ownership types (e.g., public, 
private, or subsidiary) between partner firms involved in a strategic alliance would 
decrease the likelihood of their post-alliance acquisition attempt. 
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 Intangibility  
 Sharing and/or pooling resources (namely, financial assets, brand reputation, 
knowledge, capabilities) and exchange of them are very fundamental to strategic alliance 
deals. Several studies (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1999; 
Rothaermel, 2001; Van De Ven and Walker, 1984) used resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986 and 1991) to investigate the important of resources in the 
context of strategic alliances. From a resource-based perspective, equity investments, 
including majority share acquisitions, offer preferential access to complementary 
resources of partnering firms that are sought in alliances (Colombo, Grilli, and Piva, 
2006). From the perspective of the knowledge-based view, alliances provide partners 
with an opportunity to access and combine knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
For that matter, many alliances are formed for purposes of new product development 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), knowledge production (Kale and Singh, 2007) or creation 
of new capabilities (Colombo, 2003), which require the transfer and recombination of 
existing knowledge (Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). According to Grant and Baden-
Fuller (2004), these “knowledge accessing” inter-firm alliances involve cooperative 
relationships that are not fully defined either by formal contracts or by ownership. In 
terms of Williamsonian transaction cost economics, these inter-organizational forms fall 
between the polar extremes of markets and hierarchies, making these cooperative 
relationships “intermediate” organizational forms (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Powell, 
1987; Thorelli, 1986) that are open to evolution. According to complementary 
perspectives (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003) that integrate the resource-based and the 
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knowledge-based views of the firm, the role of coordination in governance mode 
decisions play a critical role in the projection of other organizational forms. 
 Tangible characteristics (e.g., financial indicators, tangible resources, such as cash 
or cash equivalents) of an alliance deal enable partnering firms to realize whether they 
would be able to create new value from an alliance if they were to attempt an acquisition. 
In this particular hypothesis, we argue that that alliance outcomes would vary depending 
on the intangible forms of resources (e.g., knowledge) underlying an inter-firm exchange. 
When an alliance involves a knowledge-based firm, research and development (R&D) 
agreement, or a technology-based participant, the intangibility elements of the inter-
organizational relationship may hinder a focal firm’s accurate evaluation of a partnering 
firm’s value. This is likely to blur a partner’s post-alliance intent to attempt a subsequent 
acquisition. This reasoning stems from the following sources: a) Technology-based 
alliances frequently result in competitive learning, i.e., gaining greater power relative to 
the partner. This increases the likelihood of a partner to walk away from a deal, reducing 
the likelihood of alliance survival or a greater level of commitment through a subsequent 
M&A (Parkhe, 1993; Yan, 1998); b) Due to the intangibility attribute of resources 
possessed by knowledge-based firms, the value of their resources and capabilities (with 
the exception of radical innovation or certain patents) are not easily quantified or 
assessed by a partnering or acquiring firm (Arend, 2004). This hinders a firm’s ability to 
foresee the level of synergy that could potentially be achieved through further 
resource/knowledge pooling through a majority-equity acquisition. Therefore, we argue 
that knowledge, R&D partnership, and technological characteristics of an alliance deal 
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impair the abilities of focal firms to effectively evaluate the true future potential for their 
alliance partners.  
 Furthermore, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) opined that relative absorptive capacity in 
a partnership depends on specific attributes of alliances, such as, the relatedness of 
partners’ knowledge. Absorptive capacity of firms, which is defined by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) as a firm’s "ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends", is an important prerequisite for value creation in 
inter-organizational relationships. Some studies suggest that performance benefits tend to 
accumulate more readily to firms that have low to medium knowledge difference and 
firm that are capable of accessing knowledge between organizations (Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).  
 Szulanski (1996) pointed out that knowledge is sticky for a variety of individual 
and organizational conditions and despite organizational efforts, it does not move easily 
in an inter-divisional or inter-firm context. One of the key findings in the area of 
knowledge management is that integration of knowledge within or between firms is a 
very complex phenomenon (Grant, 1996; Almeida and Phene, 2004; Phene and Almeida 
2008).  The above discussions suggest that the elements of intangibility in an alliance 
deal may negatively affect the inter-firm relationship, and thus reduce further future 
resource commitments between one another.   
Hypothesis 4 (H4): When an alliance agreement involves transfer of intangible 
resources and/or capabilities, or partnership between knowledge or technology based 
firms, the likelihood of a post-alliance acquisition attempt would be reduced. 
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METHODOLOGY 
In addition to the detailed description of the sample, data sources, variables, and 
measures used to empirically test the hypotheses for the study, the following section 
provides a quick snapshot of these important aspects of our research methods:  
Sample and Data Sources 
 Data on alliance and mergers & acquisitions (M&A) announcements are extracted 
for the years 1990–2012.  The initial sample, consisting of all the entries of alliances and 
M&As, is compiled from Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database’s M&A 
and joint-venture modules.  We started by extracting data on all the alliance deal 
announcements during 1991–2010 and M&A announcements during 1991–2012. Given 
our outcome variable, we took into consideration all the acquisitions there were publicly 
announced (i.e., an acquirer made an actual attempt at purchasing a target) within that 
time period, regardless of whether they were completed or abandoned at a later time. 
Although some acquisition attempts do not realize after months and years of negotiation, 
the public announcement of an acquisition attempt is considered an important indicator of 
an acquirer’s interest in a target firm (Dikova, Sahib, and Witteloostuijn, 2010). Next, we 
excluded the partnerships that involved government agencies and/or not-for-profit 
organizations, since post-alliance acquisitions in these alliances may not be a viable 
option on regulatory grounds. Then, for each deal we determined whether the acquirer 
and target had partnered to form an alliance at any point before the acquisition 
announcement.  Finally, we augmented our dataset, by extracting financial variables from 
the Compustat database.  
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Measures 
 Dependent Variable  
 Acquisition Attempt: Since we are interested in partnering firms’ post-alliance 
acquisition behavior, the dependent variable of the study is a dichotomous categorical 
variable denoting a specific type of post-alliance strategic action, which is whether a firm 
attempted a majority share (50.1%) acquisition or not after forming an alliance with the 
same partner. All the other non-equity or equity based JVs are coded as alliance. This 
variable, therefore takes the value of 1 if a firm, previously engaged in an alliance 
agreement made a public announcement of an acquisition attempt (i.e., regardless of 
whether it was completed or abandoned) to acquire a partnering firm, and 0 otherwise. 
We followed the operationalization followed by Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee (2010) 
to determine an acquisition. 
 Explanatory Variables  
 Prior partnership (H1): This is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if 
the alliance deal involves two firms that had prior partnering agreements with one 
another (i.e., besides the only one that resulted in an acquisition attempt) in any previous 
year in the entire dataset, and 0 otherwise. We created this variable following several 
studies that measured this construct (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009; Zollo, Reuer, and 
Singh, 2002; Gulati, 1995). To operationalize this variable, we created a new variable for 
recurrent partnerships by searching the entire dataset for previous alliances between the 
same firms.  
Multi-nationality (H2): this is also a dichotomous variable. It is counted as 1 if 
the alliance deal involves two firms from the different countries and 0 if the firms are 
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from the same country as coded by alliance nation code in SDC Platinum database. We 
followed Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee (2010) to operationalize this variable.  
Ownership Type Difference (H3): This dichotomous variable captures the 
difference in the ownership/governance structure of the partnering firms in question. 
However, partnerships involving not-for-profit firms and government agencies are 
excluded from our sample given that even when the communication or coordination is 
favorable with a government agency or non-profit seeking organizations, acquisition is 
not an option. This variable therefore is counted as 0 when alliance partners involve firms 
with the same organizational type (public-public, private-private, etc.), and 1 if the deal 
engages more than one organizational ownership type (public-private, private-subsidiary, 
and so on). This variable is consistent with the measure used by Jiang, Tao, and Santoro 
(2010).  
Intangibility (H4): This variable measures the elements of intangibility or 
tacitness involved in an alliance deal. This is also a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the alliance deal involves transfer of technology, an R&D partnership, or if 
at least one of the allying firms operate in a technology-based industry, and otherwise 0.  
 Control Variables  
We used several control variables that are found by previous studies to be 
correlated with acquisition attempts. Following is a description of these variables: 
Acquisition Experience (CV1): We controlled for the effect of prior organizational 
learning of the acquiring firms. It is measured in terms of acquisition experience by 
counting the number of prior M&A deals completed by the focal firm within 4 years prior 
to the focal deal (Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006). To capture this variable, we 
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code a deal as a focal one when a prior alliance between two companies results in an 
acquisition attempt (which is our dependent variable). In this case the focal firm is the 
one that makes an acquisition attempt (or the acquirer).  
Alliance Experience (CV2): Consistent with Gulati et al. (2009), we count the 
number of prior alliance deals formed by the focal firm within 4 years prior to the focal 
deal and follow the same calculation method that we did for acquisition experience to 
operationalize alliance experience to create this variable. The only exception is that we 
apply the formula to count the number of alliance deals undertaken by a focal firm, 
instead of number of acquisitions. This way we use a proxy for an acquirer’s 
organizational learning in alliance activities by capturing the number of prior alliance 
deals.  
Number of Alliance Partners in a Deal (CV3): Prior research suggests that the 
number of alliance partners, especially when more than two partners are involved in an 
alliance, are likely to complicate the interactions of the parties in a deal. Therefore, we 
control for this effect. We coded this variable 1 for alliances involving two participants, 
and for any other number of alliance partners in a deal, we coded 0. 
Acquirer’s Public Status (CV4): This variable captures whether the partnering 
firms are publicly owned/traded. Publicly owned companies, more so than privately 
owned ones, must comply with national and international regulations throughout all 
phases of trading activities (Dikova, et al., 2010). This feature of publicly owned 
companies may cause delays in the completion of an acquisition deal or a focal firm’s 
motivation to acquire a publicly held target (Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin, 2004).  
“Public” status of the participants was coded 1, 0 otherwise.  
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Target Attractiveness (CV5): A highly attractive target is likely to receive more 
attention from potential acquirers if they are financially better performing firm. To proxy 
for a firm’s attractiveness as a target for acquisition, we gauge its financial strength in 
terms of Return on Equity (ROE). The higher the value for this measure, the higher a 
firm’s attractiveness as a target.  
Finally, we used binary variables to control for year-specific variations. 
Statistical Technique 
Hypotheses of this study predicted the likelihood of post-alliance acquisition 
given a number of explanatory variables. The dependent variable of the hypotheses is a 
binary variable. Given the dichotomous nature of these dependent variables, use of a 
logistics regression (logit) is appropriate (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981; Greene, 1997; 
Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). A logit model captures that the probabilities will be 
within the (0, 1) range. The statistical analyses for logit models are based on binomial 
distribution and have several advantages, including: a) there is no need for explanatory 
variables and dependent variable to be normally distributed, b) the model can handle 
nonlinear effects, and c) it allows for explanatory variables to be categorical (Menard, 
2001).  
We estimated the logit model using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure 
that presents outputs in parameter estimates that are consistent and asymptotically 
efficient for large samples. To test the significance of the entire logit model, we used the 
model log likelihood chi-square, which is analogous to the multivariate F-test in linear 
regression testing the null hypothesis where all coefficients are zero. The parameters 
(logits) estimated are the natural log of the odds ratio and are interpreted in the following 
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manner: a positive (negative) logit means that the odds that the binary dependent variable 
equals 1 increase (decrease) when the independent variable increases (decreases). In other 
words, a positive coefficient designates a positive association and a negative coefficient 
designates a negative association. In addition, because we have panel data (i.e., multiple 
dimensions, years, and observations per firm that may not be independent), we use 
STATA’s ‘xtlogit’ command with fixed effects that group observations based on firm 
identification. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 and 2 provide the bivariate correlation matrix and descriptive statistics 
(i.e., mean and standard deviations) for our measures. A glance at the correlation matrix 
reveals that there are no significantly high correlations that could confound results due to 
multicollinearity that lead to variance inflation. The results showed that among the 
predictor variables, including the control variables, the variance inflation factor (VIF) did 
not exceed the suggested cutoff limit of 10 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Netter, 2004; 
Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller, 1988). More specifically, all of these VIF estimates 
were below 8. Therefore, the assumption for the existence of no significant threat of 
multicollinearity was met.  
 
Table 3 presents the logistic regression results we used to test hypotheses 1-5. The 
hypotheses examine the proposed relationships between post-alliance acquisition attempt 
and various deal and partnership related variables.  This table first introduces the control 
variables to create a baseline model against which to compare our subsequent hypothesis 
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tests. The direct effect variables, namely prior partnership, multi-nationality, 
organizational ownership type difference, and intangibility elements of the deal are 
introduced in the subsequent models along with the control variables.  
 
Model I in Table 3 is the baseline model introducing only the control variables. 
Model 1 tests the first hypothesis regarding prior partnership. The first hypothesis 
expected a positive relationship between prior partnership between alliance partners and 
the likelihood of a subsequent acquisition. Model II tests H1 and finds strong support for 
the hypothesized relationship in H1 (p<0.01) in the opposite direction than what we 
anticipated. 
 Based on the logic of institutional difference embedded in international business, 
we anticipated negative implications of national difference in partners’ relational 
exchange in an alliance setting and its possible bearing on partners’ post-alliance strategic 
action. The results of this relationship are represented by Model III. The model suggests 
strong significant support for H2 (p<0.01), fully consistent with our arguments that 
national difference between the partners engaged in an alliance deal is likely to reduce the 
possibility of a post-alliance acquisition attempt.  
Our third hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between the difference in 
organizational ownership type and a post-alliance acquisition attempt. Prior literature 
suggested that difference of organizational structure and purposes may impose greater 
complexities in the process of relational exchanges in an alliance deal. This hypothesis 
H3, tested by Model IV, was also found to be strongly significant (p<0. 01) in the 
predicted direction as to a negative association. The data suggests difference of 
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organizational ownership type undermines a focal firm’s desire to acquire its current 
alliance partner.  
Consistent with our prediction, H4 was strongly supported (p<0.01), suggesting a 
negative association between the existence of intangibility elements in an alliance deal 
and post-alliance acquisition attempt. This hypothesis was based on the challenges of 
relational exchanges in inter-organizational contexts that are rooted in knowledge-based 
theory of the firm. Model V in table 3 tests this relationship. With a significant and 
negative coefficient (p<0.01), our analysis suggests that H4 was also strongly supported. 
The overall results of our analyses generally confirm our overarching theoretical 
arguments. Specifically, the results offer support for our hypotheses regarding the 
likelihood of relational and deal specific characteristics, namely, national difference (H2), 
ownership type difference (H3), and intangibility elements (H4). These empirical 
findings indicate that certain relational mechanisms are shaped by the dyadic and/or deal 
characteristics of the alliance deals, and may influence firms to make a post-alliance 
acquisition attempt when the setting of a prior alliance is favorable for the partners to 
have mutually satisfactory partnering experience.  
Support for H2, H3, and H4 indicate the importance of dyadic and deal-specific 
characteristics that have strategic implications for future target selection. Three such sets 
of assumptions contribute to these relational dynamics: 
a) Increased barriers to inter-firm communication, co-ordination, conflict 
resolution, increased learning and routine-development costs between alliance 
partners influence the relational mechanism as evidenced by a potential 
acquirer’s perception of a future target’s attractiveness. 
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b) Multi-national setting, organizational type difference, and intangibility 
involved in an alliance deal lead to difficulties in developing a stable and 
consistent relational experience in the inter-organizational exchange process, 
which as a result make a potential target less attractive. 
c) Prior partnering experience contributes to relational capability development to 
encourage a future governance change (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1999, 
2007; Kale et al., 2002; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) especially in terms of 
further control and resource commitment through acquisition.  
H1 tested by Model II that sought for a relationship between recurrent partnership 
between an acquirer and a target firm and the likelihood of post-alliance acquisition was 
not supported. However, we found it to be strongly significant in the opposite direction, 
i.e., a negative coefficient, in respect to what we anticipated. This suggests that when 
partners are involved in more than one alliance deals with each other, the likelihood of an 
acquisition attempt will decrease. In other words, partners are less likely to engage in a 
post-alliance acquisition when they have had multiple partnership deals with the same 
partner in the past. This is quite contrary to the prior findings in strategic alliance 
research (Gulati and Sytch, 2007, 2008; Wang and Zajac, 2007; Zaheer, McEvily, and 
Perrone, 1998). One possible explanation may be that where partners are already 
enjoying specific transaction, strategic, and financial benefits emanating from partner-
specific experience (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009), they are less likely to take a 
alternate action that may threaten the trust and mutuality underlying the status quo. Given 
the multiplicity of alliance agreements between the partners, the partner-specific 
dependency rises. Thus, partners may become less motivated to change the governance 
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structure from a relatively hands-off relationship to a dominant or controlling role by 
making an acquisition. 
LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, this study attempts to contribute to corporate development activities 
literature by synthesizing findings of both alliance and M&A research streams. While this 
study represents an important step towards understanding the factors relating to a focal 
firm’s post-alliance M&A strategy, a few aspects of our research model could complicate 
our conclusions, if they are not considered with caution. First, since we focus on 
announced deals based on publicly available data, we are unable to evaluate how the 
managerial decision-making process may influence a post-alliance acquisition attempt. In 
other words we make an assumption that the short and long period of inter-organizational 
relationships and/or actions influence a firm’s future strategic actions. Hence we make 
the assumption that the dyadic nature of partnership-specific characteristics and 
exchanges in an alliance deal that are beyond a focal firm’s immediate control play an 
important role in predicting a focal firm’s post-alliance acquisition attempt. Future case-
based and survey-based research may seek to examine whether these managerial factors 
play a role in post-alliance acquisition decisions. Second, our empirical results may be 
somewhat limited by methods or practices used in the data collection of the data sources. 
Despite our sincere attempts to maximize the data points for this study, given the 
reporting standards and availability of data in SDC Platinum database we had to exclude 
several of the alliance and acquisition deals. However, it was no exception to many other 
rigorous studies that used the same data source, including the ones published in leading 
strategy journals.  
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Given the emerging body of research in this cross-form inter-organizational 
context, future survey-based or qualitative studies may be conducted to examine the 
accumulated alliance experience of both acquiring and target firms for post-alliance 
acquisition strategies. Such research may also confirm whether the observed effects of 
relational mechanisms hold true for other modes of alliances, in populations of smaller 
firms, or firms from developing and/or emerging economies. However, it is also 
important to realize the challenge of data-collection on alliances that involve less formal 
arrangements and in cross-cultural contexts, especially when the archival data sources are 
inadequate. 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
Previous studies have made substantial progress in understanding various sets of 
firm, industry, contextual, and relational characteristics that determine the choice 
between/among alternative governance structures, i.e., different forms alliances, mergers 
& acquisitions, partner selection in alliances and acquisitions. However, this study 
focused on understanding a cross-form choice between alliances and acquisitions, which 
required synthesis of two parallel streams of research. The objective was to understand 
whether dyadic exchange in an alliance may positively or negatively associate with the 
likelihood of post alliance acquisition. Despite some limitations, we believe, this study 
informs strategy researchers and practitioners with important insights about inter-firm 
relationship mechanisms. The broader implication of the study, evidently, is taking an 
integrative approach to understanding interdependency of experience and learning across 
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various types of corporate development activities (i.e., multi-task setting). Specific 
contributes of this study include: 
 Identifying several important deal/dyadic characteristics, e.g., multi-national 
context, organizational type difference, and intangibility which are found to 
undermine the relational dynamics of an inter-organizational experience and have 
implications for future strategic outcomes. 
 Explaining the process how the relational mechanisms of an alliance lead to very 
important decision making at the corporate level phenomenon of future target 
selection for acquiring firms.  
 Extending strategy literature by highlighting the relevance of path-dependent and 
cross-form nature of organizational learning for inter-organizational strategies.  
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STUDY II:  
DOES PRIOR ALLIANCE EXPERIENCE OF AN ACQUIRER SPILL OVER TO ITS 
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In their work on the myopia of learning, March and Levinthal (1993) described the 
hazards of increasing specialization in a particular domain of learning. The assumption is that 
the knowledge and experience gained in one organizational activity can hinder learning in 
another activity, implying a potential for negative experience spillover effects. In contrast, 
Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) theory of absorptive capacity recognizes a multitask perspective 
of learning. They suggested that firms, having developed substantial knowledge in a certain 
domain, may become more skilled at expanding the span of their competence into excelling in 
related contexts, which acknowledges positive learning effects across organizational activities. 
In view of the vast literature in organizational learning and given the recent scholarly 
contributions, it is evident that the performance outcomes of organizational learning across 
various corporate development activities remains as an area open for further research. The 
framework for learning spillover, therefore, is of inherent interest to strategy scholars and 
practitioners alike, not only because of their managerial relevance, but also because there 
appears to be intriguing inconsistencies to explain the processes that are not evident in more 
traditional, single-task learning models (Zollo and Reuer, 2010).  
A number of recent studies implied that there might be experience spillover effects or 
interdependency of learning between strategic alliance and acquisition activities at the dyadic 
(i.e., partner-specific) level (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee, 
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2010; Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz, and Croson, 2012). Each of these handful of papers 
considered research questions that explain this experience spillover effect from a dyadic level 
of partner-specific learning. However, in this study we are guided by the following broad 
questions: Does alliance experience, e.g., organizational memory, routines, and their recency 
at the program level (i.e., beyond just partner-specific learning) of a focal firm’s alliance-
specific learning have any transfer effects across its corporate development activities through 
acquisitions? This central question leads us to ponder additional questions: Which aspects of 
alliance-based learning can potentially explain the focal acquirer’s acquisition performance? 
Even more specifically, we are interested in examining whether frequency, recency, and 
relatedness of different dimensions of prior alliances of an acquirer, beyond the dyad-level 
experience, relate to superior acquisition performance. To explain this phenomenon, we rely 
on the concepts of procedural, declarative, and transactive memory previously used by 
organizational learning scholars. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKDROP: TRANSFER OF LEARNING IN A MULTI-TASK 
SETTING 
In this section, we trace the building blocks of organizational learning in a multi-task 
setting highlighting the contributions of cognitive psychologists and researchers of 
organizational learning:  
Experience as a Source of Organizational Memory  
Not all organizational experience and learning are equally or universally useful. 
Cognitive psychologists have long established that the context, elements, and 
organization of knowledge are critical to the directionality (vertical or lateral) of the 
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transfer of learning (Thorndike, 1901, 1903; Gagne, 1966; Tversky, 1977). Furthermore, 
organizational learning scholars have long opined that since experience becomes less 
useful over time, the benefits of prior experience may not increase monotonically with 
the amount of experience that a firm accumulates (Argote, 1999; Barnett, Greve, and 
Park, 1994; Hayward, 2002). This suggests that the timing of learning is critical. For 
instance, environmental changes (e.g., change in regulations, industry standards) may 
lead routines, procedures, and contexts to become less relevant to obsolete.  For example, 
Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan (2006) suggested that certain regulatory changes in the 
banking industry forced banks to review their existing acquisition strategies, to modify 
their templates for making acquisitions, and to search for new practices. Because those 
regulatory changes marked significant shifts in the industry, a bank’s acquisition 
experience before the changes might not represent viable repositories for future learning. 
Such experience might even lead firms to adopt outdated routines and undermine their 
performance by replicating strategies that worked well under different circumstances 
(Barney and Hesterley, 1996). 
Organizational Routines as Elements of Learning 
Organizational routines are believed to be the repository of organizational 
capabilities (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Research on routines as repositories of organizational capabilities (Dosi, Nelson, and 
Winter, 2000; Winter 2000, 2003; Zollo and Winter, 2002) has emphasized that 
organizational routines do not just preserve the past, but, being a repository of 
organizational capabilities, they also shape how deliberate learning occurs inside firms, 
thereby paving the way for the future development of the firm (Winter, 2000; Zollo and 
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Winter, 2002). It is believed that strategic decisions are influenced by routines, i.e., 
repetitive patterns of activity and capabilities, that develop from organizational 
experience (Nelson and Winter, 1982). A considerable body of research established that 
routines are those elements of organizational memory that drive important organizational 
actions and serve as the repository of organizational capabilities (March and Simon, 
1958; Cyert and March, 1963, Nelson and Winter, 1982). Additionally, greater 
experience with a particular type of repetitive behavior provides a platform for firms to 
build and refine routines, and enhances the likelihood of the routine being used further 
yielding superior organizational outcomes.  Given that routines are a crucial part of how 
firms accomplish their tasks, in this section, we state the relevance of organizational 
experience as it relates to the transfer of learning from a focal firm’s alliance activities to 
acquisition performance.  
Context of Experience and Learning 
 The literature on learning in the context of alliances covered several types of 
experience: general collaborative experience, industry-specific alliance experience (e.g., 
technology-based deals), and partner-specific alliance experience (Gulati, Lavie, Singh, 2009; 
Reuer, Zollo, Singh, 2002). General collaborative experience refers to a focal firm’s overall 
alliance experience in the previous years. Industry-specific alliance experience includes a focal 
firm’s experience in only those alliances with other firms (i.e., partners) from a particular 
industry. Finally, partner-specific alliance experience entails a focal firm’s learning with a 
specific partner at a dyadic level. The empirical evidence as to which of these types of 
experience leads to superior collaborative performance has been largely inconclusive (Gulati, 
Lavie, and Singh, 2009; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
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Alliance Experience Spill-Over to Acquisition 
 Organizations learn from prior experience, and this learning is transferrable to 
accomplishing the same or related tasks in different contexts. One of the studies that 
contributed to understanding organizational learning in a multi-task setting was 
conducted by Zollo and Reuer (2010). They examined how, at a dyadic level of inter-
organizational partnership, organizational experience accumulated between partnering 
firms may influence the performance of another as the nature of the partnership changes. 
A valuable contribution of this study involves developing and testing a contingent theory 
of learning across organizational activities as alliance partners decide to pursue a deeper 
level of integration through acquisition. To understand the transfer of learning from the 
task of alliances to acquisitions, this study theorized that partner-specific alliance 
experience of a firm would be beneficial to the performance of the focal acquisition when 
an acquisition is managed in ways that resemble the typical handling of its alliances. 
However, when acquisitions are managed with more aggressive post-acquisition 
management approaches, the benefits of alliance experience can cease to work and can 
even adversely affect the acquisition performance. 
Another recent study (Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banarjee, 2010) that integrated 
alliance activities and acquisition performance drew on the concept of absorptive 
capacity (Dyer and Singh 1998) as a pre-condition for weakening both pre- and post-
acquisition information asymmetry to understanding acquisition performance. This study, 
also at the dyadic level of partnership, postulated that partner-specific absorptive capacity 
is enhanced through prior alliance experience with targets and is particularly useful in 
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ameliorating information asymmetry both in international acquisitions and knowledge-
intensive acquisitions.  
Yet another study by Agarwal et al. (2012) applied insights from organization 
design, economic game theory, and social psychology to emphasize the importance of 
prior resource allocation and communication in reducing behavioral uncertainty that 
arises in inter-unit coordination settings within and across organizations. This study’s 
focus was to examine the extent to which routines created under one inter-organizational 
form (i.e., strategic alliances) at a dyadic level of relationship may be successfully 
transferred to another inter-organizational architecture (i.e., acquisition of a couple of 
alliance partners). This study particularly emphasized the importance of developing inter-
organizational social processes and norms for superior acquisition performance. 
From a theoretical standpoint, previous studies have proposed that pre-acquisition 
alliance activities may enhance performance in an acquisition (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Kogut, 1991; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Hagedoorn 
and Sadowski, 1999; Porrini, 2004). However, the empirical evidence, thus far, is unable 
to provide a conclusive answer to the question as to which aspects of alliance experience 
contribute to performance differences. For instance, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) 
reported a positive association between prior alliances on market reaction to acquisition 
announcements examining 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions, of which 28 percent had 
prior alliances. Whereas Zaheer et al. (2010) found no main effects of prior alliances 
between partners on their post-acquisition performance. Therefore, to extend our 
understanding based on this growing body of literature, we attempt to advance our theory 
beyond the dyadic view of experience spillover. More specifically, we examine the 
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implications of organizational memory, routines, and relevance of learning from a focal 
acquirer’s recent alliance experience in various contexts and with others firms to examine 
performance in this multi-task setting of transfer of learning. 
 
 It is apparent that researchers, to date, have mostly been interested in explaining 
benefits for organizational learning in alliances and acquisitions at the dyadic level of 
partnership. However, given the overall progress made by researchers at the program 
level of organizational learning, though separately in alliance and acquisition literature, in 
this study, we extend this literature of performance implications of transfer effects to the 
overall corporate and alliance & acquisition program level (as opposed to partner-specific 
learning) by integrating both of these streams of literature. Building on cognitive 
psychologists’ assumptions, we argue that an organization’s recent memory, 
commonality of elements, routines, and the context of learning in alliances may 
positively relate to enhanced performance in acquisitions. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Building on the above theoretical background, we theorize on developing the 
following hypotheses. An illustration of these hypothesized relationships is presented in the 
conceptual model of the study (Figure 3 - Study II):   
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Acquirer’s Alliance Experience and Acquisition Performance  
Previous studies have widely speculated that post-acquisition performance may be 
improved by pre-acquisition alliance activity (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Bleeke and 
Ernst, 1995; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999). We develop this notion further by illustrating 
how a greater number of alliance experiences of an acquiring firm can enhance post-alliance 
acquisition performance: a) From a future target selection viewpoint, the number of prior 
alliance experiences may serve as an important screening technique for potential acquisition 
targets and have a positive performance effect (Kogut, 1991; Arend, 2004; Agarwal, Anand, 
Bercovitz, and Croson, 2012); b) consistent with the notion of “learning before doing” 
(Pisano, 1994), post-acquisition performance can be facilitated by the learning opportunity 
that firms may have due to their exposure to related and/or similar activities as they continue 
to cooperate in the post-acquisition organizational context; and c) due to the similarities 
between alliance and acquisition activities (Newburry and Zeira, 1997; Zeira and Newburry, 
1999), numerous distinct processes and routines may be formed during alliance activities. 
These routines and learning may be applied to a post-acquisition context, which may enhance 
organizational efficiency in future acquisition integration processes and positively affect 
acquisition performance (Agarwal et al., 2012).  
Whereas routine formation reinforces the experiential lessons learned from the 
routines and further adoption of a certain routine (March, 1981), the nature of prior 
organizational activities sets a more favorable stage for initial routinization and memory 
formation. When firms partner with organizations of different sizes, structures, purposes, and 
regions, the cumulative experience gained from these partnerships increases their breadth of 
future search, learning capabilities, and existing routines, thereby increasing their capabilities 
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and efficiency (e.g., Jiang, Tao, and Santoro, 2010; Lavie, 2007; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2006; 
Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Stuart, 2000). We believe that by engaging in a higher number 
of alliances, an acquirer can adeptly adjust its overall routines and processes and translate 
them into value enhancing systems for future acquisitions.  
On the other hand, each time a firm’s knowledge or learning is applied, opinions about 
the questions of “what works and why they work” are more firmly embedded in managerial 
cognition, thus routines become firmly established in an organization (Levitt and March, 
1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, we believe that when alliance experience of a 
firm is insignificant, it may limit information processing and organizational search, which in 
turn may limit the creation of new routines and norms (Huber, 1991) for related organizational 
tasks – in this case acquisitions.  
Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) argued that when differences in organizational tasks 
become too large (for instance, a company operates only in related industries or countries), it 
may ultimately hamper learning and a company may find it difficult to understand and 
interpret the different knowledge and routines and, as a consequence, will have problems 
absorbing and learning from other firms (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and Bell, 1997; 
Huber, 1991; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Given that alliance/acquisition capability 
development, i.e., routines, memories, knowledge, processes, systems, structures, and skills, 
takes place primarily on the program level through a series of deals rather than from individual 
deals (Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002), this process requires 
multiple alliance agreements for a firm to be able to build routines and draw correct inferences 
from previous tasks (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Therefore, we anticipate: 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher the number of strategic alliances, the higher the 
likelihood that the acquirer firm would have a superior acquisition performance. 
 
Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Industry 
 Cognitive psychologists have used a variety of technical terms to indicate transfer 
effects in individual learning processes. Some of them have to do with the type of knowledge 
being transferred (e.g., motor or cognitive skills, declarative or procedural memory, etc.); the 
existence and strength of rules identifying the task (Holland et al. 1986); the existence, 
number, order, and type of cues or examples to refer to in the learning (Gick and Holyoak 
1983, 1887; Cheng et al. 1986) and transfer processes (Reed et al. 1974, Hayes and Simon 
1977); and the learner’s background knowledge (Bransford and Franks 1976, Larkin et al. 
1980).  
A significant body of organizational learning literature has built on these notions of 
individual learning applied to the organizational level.  Absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) is one such extension. Firms with high levels of absorptive capacity learn 
quickly from other firms and can develop routines that create economies of scale. Absorptive 
capacity refers to “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Building on this 
premise, we argue that prior knowledge in a certain context (e.g., industry) can enhance the 
effects of learning from other related tasks.  
 Additionally, organizations are believed to have frames of reference, structures, 
routines, and physical artifacts that reflect knowledge retention (Moorman and Miner, 1997; 
Walsh and Ungson, 1991), which is conceptualized as organizational memory. At the 
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individual as well as organizational levels, Anderson (1983) proposed that two types of 
memory are relevant to organizational learning: a) procedural memory as to how things are 
done (e.g., skills and routines) and b) declarative memory in terms of general memory for 
facts, events, material forms, and shared information (e.g., reports, summaries, agreements). 
We theorize that both of these memory types in alliances will facilitate acquisition 
performance. Procedural memory is particularly helpful since it is domain-dependent 
(Moorman and Miner, 1998), which is evidently the case for alliances in a particular industry.  
From the perspective of the content and level of organizational memory, a firm that has 
experience in a specific industry for some time will likely accumulate a high level of 
declarative memory about the competitive dynamics and detailed traits of the industry 
(Moorman and Miner, 1998) that they will be able to use in the acquisition context.   
Given the interplay of absorptive capacity, organizational routines, and memory, we 
believe that an acquiring firm’s alliance experience in a target’s industry will likely benefit the 
acquirer’s acquisition performance in a focal deal. We believe this occurs for the following 
reasons. First, though not in the same task (i.e., alliance vs. acquisition) or with the same 
partner (i.e., partner-specific learning), an acquirer’s familiarity with alliance activities within 
a target firm’s industry helps them to gain valuable prior knowledge and to develop 
organizational memory about similar businesses in the target firm's industry. Second, prior 
knowledge of the acquirer in a target firm’s industry enables the acquirer to correctly assess a 
target firm’s strengths and capabilities as a potential target (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Third, 
business similarity and industry knowledge help the acquirer to draw on previously 
established routines and collaborative processes that are specific to the target firm's industry 
and use them in the focal acquisition deal. Finally, the acquirer’s level of prior industry 
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knowledge facilitates building a post-acquisition relationship of mutual trust, communication, 
trust, and reciprocity that are critical for successful post-acquisition integration (Zaheer, 
McEvily, Perrone, 1998). Therefore, we predict the following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): An acquirer firm’s alliance experience in the target firm’s industry 
is positively correlated with its acquisition performance. 
 
Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Country 
 Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that organizations need a level of preparedness, in 
other words, prior knowledge and absorptive capacity for effective transfer of prior 
experience.  In this section, we continue to extend this argument of preparedness to the context 
of geographical preparedness for transfer of learning between tasks. We believe the level of 
preparedness is especially relevant in a multi-task transfer setting, because organizational 
ability to engage in effective learning is hindered when multiple parameters of the 
learning process are changed simultaneously (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  A vast 
body of literature in international business and global strategy established that cross-
national distance matters (Ghemawat, 2001). It particularly does so when it relates to 
inter-organizational exchanges where differences in norms, values, practices, rules, and 
policies result in a lack of contextual knowledge, liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), 
breeding problems of communication, coordination, trust, and uncertainty.  
Given this cross-national setting, in addition to declarative and procedural memory, 
we theorize on the implications of transactive memory (Wegner, 1986).  Wegner proposed 
that encoding, storing, and retrieval of memory are facilitated by various types of interactions 
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and transactions (hence the name) between and among group members in an organization. 
Oftentimes, labels and generalization by individuals play an important role in such transactive 
memory. We believe transactive memory is especially relevant in the context of cross-national 
inter-organizational exchange. Dyadic distance matters in an inter-organizational exchange 
process: higher geographic, economic, political, cultural, administrative, and psychic 
distance make it more difficult to impose the acquiring firm’s dominant logic (Verbeke, 
2010).  
We propose that experience with international alliances, particularly partnerships 
with other firms in a target firm’s country, is likely to be valuable in reducing the 
problems of liability of foreignness, information asymmetry in cross-national setting 
(Robson, Katsikeas, Bello, 2008; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993), and issues of transactive 
memory building in a cross-national setting. Thus, we draw on prior research to suggest 
that familiarity with a target’s home country, albeit in a different task, makes 
international acquisitions more successful. Whereas issues arising from information 
asymmetry and difficulties due to transactive memory in a cross-national setting increase 
the difficulties of pre-acquisition negotiation (Dikova, et al., 2010) and post-acquisition 
integration (Zander and Zander, 2010; Verbeke 2010), leading to an inferior acquisition 
performance. Therefore, we predict the following relationship: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): An acquirer firm’s alliance experience in the target firm’s country is 
positively correlated with its acquisition performance. 
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Moderating Role of Acquirer’s Acquisition Experience  
According to Thorndike (1903) and Tversky (1977), transfer of learning in a multi-
task setting may occur when learning in one context/task enhances (positive transfer) or 
undermines (negative transfer) performance in another related context/task. Transfer of 
learning may also take different forms: near transfer (to closely related contexts /tasks) and far 
transfer (to rather different contexts /tasks) (Perkin and Salomon, 1992). Gagne (1966) used a 
skill hierarchy to distinguish between lateral (transfer between different tasks) and vertical 
(transfer between lower and higher level skills) transfer of learning. We believe that transfer of 
learning from alliance experience to acquisition performance is a case both of lateral (due to 
the difference in alliance and acquisition activities) and vertical transfer (from collaborative 
relationship to increased interdependency and resource commitment in acquisitions).  
Alliances and acquisitions, though the two alternative governance structures share 
commonality (Wang and Zajac, 2007; Zeira and Newburry, 1999), thus are considered two 
different corporate activities. Their similarities can be perceived in an organization’s search 
for alliance/acquisition partners, negotiation and evaluation of the deal, and post-deal 
organization and coordination (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). More importantly, at the corporate 
level, both of these activities are commonly managed by the same department, which is 
critical to firm-level learning.  Despite these similarities, alliances and acquisitions also 
have several differences that may complicate the transfer of learning when firms 
implement acquisitions relying on their prior alliance experiences. Alliances and 
acquisitions are alternative governance structures requiring different levels of control and 
coordination (Wang and Zajac, 2007). From a deal-making standpoint, these activities 
also differ since acquisitions tends to be characterized by a much more formal and 
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extensive due diligence (Zollo and Reuer, 2010). On the other hand, alliance structures 
tend to be more transitional in nature (Phene and Tallman 2012; Reuer, Zollo, and Singh, 
2002; Ariño and De La Torre, 1998; Doz and Hamel, 1998), involving a co-evolution of 
trust, control, and learning (Inkpen and Currall 2004). Notwithstanding these differences, 
a case has been made in the literature that past alliance experiences might be sufficiently 
similar in the dimensions of task, process, or context to some acquisitions to influence the 
latter’s performance. Therefore, positive experience spillovers may occur due to the 
similarity between alliance (learned activity in one task) and acquisition activities (the 
one to which learning is applied) (Thorndike, 1903; Tversky, 1977).  
Considering both the similarities and differences in alliances and acquisitions, we 
argue that an acquirer’s acquisition related memory, routines, capabilities, etc. will 
enhance its learning from alliance activities. Therefore, we expect an interaction between 
an acquirer’s prior acquisition experience and alliance experience in predicting the 
relationship between alliance experience and subsequent acquisition performance: 
Hypotheses 4 (H4): An acquirer’s acquisition experience will positively moderate the 
following relationships between: 
(H4a) acquirer’s alliance experience and acquisition performance, such that the 
positive relationship will be strengthened by the acquirer’s recent acquisition 
experience. 
(H4b) acquirer’s alliance experience in target firm’s industry and acquisition 
performance, such that the positive relationship will be strengthened by the 
acquirer’s recent acquisition experience. 
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(H4c) acquirer’s alliance experience in target firm’s country and acquisition 
performance, such that the positive relationship will be strengthened by the 
acquirer’s recent acquisition experience. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
A detailed description of the sample, data sources, variables, and measures used 
to empirically test the hypotheses of the study are provided in the following section:  
 
Sample and Data Sources 
 Data on alliance and mergers & acquisitions (M&A) announcements were 
extracted for the years 1990–2012.  The initial sample consisted of all the entries of 
alliances and M&As compiled from Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum 
database’s M&A and joint-venture modules.  The initial sample included all the alliance 
deal announcements during 1991–2010 and M&A announcements during 1991–2012. 
Next, from the M&A sample, for hypotheses testing, due to availability of data for the US 
firms, we included only those firms that come from US origin and furthermore, those cases 
where acquisitions were actually completed.  In other words, we are interested in only those 
acquisitions that are initiated and completed by US firms within years 1994 and 2010. Though 
the data is available prior to 1994, acquisitions until 1994 were excluded since we had to 
measure the alliance experience variable which is based on 4 years data prior to the focal 
acquisition and since this set of data starts from 1991. Finally, we complemented our data, 
by extracting a number of financial variables (e.g., ROE) from the Compustat database.  
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Measures 
 Dependent Variable  
Acquisition Performance: Acquisition performance attempts to capture the 
superiority of a firm’s ex post financial performance, given the event of a completed 
acquisition. We used accounting based measures to calculate an acquiring firm’s 
performance from a focal acquisition. Consistent with Zollo and Reuer (2010) and Meeks 
and Meeks (1981), we used a measure capturing the change in return on equity of a focal 
acquiring firm following a completed acquisition. In other words, performance was 
measured as the difference between the return on equity (ROE) of the acquiring firm two 
years after the acquisition relative to one year prior to the acquisition.  
An alternate method to measure acquisition performance is to use a cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) value given an M&A announcement. It is an ex ante market-
based proxy for actual returns based on the stock market reactions given the 
announcement of an M&A event. Researchers using this event-study method have used a 
variety of a short to a long window ranging from 7 days to  241 days around an 
acquisition announcement (e.g., Zaheer, et al., 2010; McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 
2008; Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006). While CAR is one of the most widely 
used measures for capturing M&A performance, it has some major drawbacks. First, the 
subjective judgment of the researcher in terms of using a small/medium/long window 
opens the interpretation of the results for criticism. Second, since event-study method 
entails using the collective response of stock market investors regarding the potential 
performance implications of an M&A, it works as a proxy rather than gauging the actual 
performance effects of an M&A.  
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To address these potential issues with event-study methods, following Kim and 
Finkelstein (2009) and Zollo and Reuer (2010), we opted to use an accounting based 
measure for this variable, e.g., ROE extracted from the Compustat database. 
Additionally, we chose ROE over the measure of return on assets (ROA) since our 
sample includes both service (low fixed asset) and manufacturing (high fixed asset) type 
firms. 
 Explanatory Variables  
 Acquirer’s Recent Alliance Experience (H1): To observe the performance 
implications of organizational routines and learning accumulate from recent alliance 
experience of an acquiring firm, we created a measure of recent alliance experience by 
capturing an acquiring firms’ alliance deals.  The underlying assumption is that with 
every alliance deal, a future acquirer develops valuable insight and routines (Gulati, 
Lavie, Singh, 2009; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002), and building on related routines, 
acquiring firms gain superior acquisition performance (Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan, 
2006). However, as we discussed in the theoretical background section of this paper, 
recency is an important dimension to the relevance of experience and routines (Zollo and 
Reuer, 2010; Ingram and Simons, 2002; Ingram and Baum 1997; Argote and Epple, 
1990).  
To operationalize this variable, we track the acquiring firms’ number of alliances 
deals prior to a focal acquisition attempt. In this case, the focal acquirer firm is the one 
that completes an acquisition attempt. Furthermore, our alliance experience variable is 
calculated based on the number of cross-border alliances completed by a focal acquirer 
within 4 years prior to the focal acquisition.  
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Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Industry (H2): This variable 
attempts to capture a focal acquirer’s partnering experience in a specific industry that 
may be applicable to a future acquisition. This variable is an ordinal variable representing 
the number of alliances an acquiring firm had in the same industry, as differentiated by 
the SIC codes of the target firm’s industry within 4 years prior to the focal acquisition. To 
operationalize this variable, we created a new variable based on the number of alliance 
partnerships by searching the specific windows of alliance data given the announcement 
date of a focal acquisition. According to Schilling (2009), of the most popular alliance 
databases, the SDC Platinum covers the widest range of industry sectors between 1985 
and 2005. We used Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to denote industry 
specific alliance experience consistent with Anand and Khanna (2000) and Jiang, Tao, 
and Santoro (2010).  
Acquirer’s Alliance Experience in Target’s Country (H3): Similar to the 
previous explanatory variable, this variable is intended as a proxy of the acquirer’s 
routines and experience in particular country that may be applied to enhance future 
acquisition performance in the same national context. This variable is also an ordinal 
variable representing the number of alliances an acquiring firm had in the same nation of 
its target in the focal acquisition. This is measured by taking into account alliance 
participants’ primary nation codes in the alliance deals that were completed within 4 
years prior to the focal acquisition. According to Schilling (2009), of the all-sector 
datasets, SDC Platinum appears to be the most inclusive in terms of types of nations (as 
denoted by participants’ nation codes) represented. We used participants’ two digit nation 
codes to capture an acquiring firm’s country specific alliance experience.  
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Acquirer’s Acquisition Experience (H4): This variable captures an acquiring 
firm’s experience, organizational memory, and routines developed from recent 
acquisition deals. Although acquisition experience is not a direct measure of 
organizational learning, it has been extensively used in the literature as a proxy, and can 
be reasonably expected to yield a strong positive correlation between the number of 
previous acquisitions and development of acquisition capabilities and routines (Zaheer, et 
al., 2010). We measure this ordinal variable by taking into account the frequency of prior 
acquisition deals completed by an acquirer firm within 4 years prior to the focal deal 
(Zaheer et al., 2010; Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006; Hayward, 2002; Argote and 
Epple, 1990).  
Control Variables  
Several decades of work on understanding acquisition performance identifies 
numerous firm-, industry-, country-, and deal-specific variables that may relate to an 
acquirer’s superior performance. In addition to the main predictor variables described 
above, to address the acquiring firm’s resources and possible confounding effects of other 
acquisitions on accounting or financial returns, we used the following control variables in 
our model: 
Acquiring Firm’s Characteristics:  
a) Acquirer Size (CV1): We used a proxy for an acquirer’s size; measured as the 
logarithm of the acquiring firm’s total assets in billions of dollars for the year before the 
acquisition event (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Haleblian et al., 2006). 
b) Acquirer’s debt to equity ratio (CV2) to proxy for the availability of financial 
resources available to the acquiring firm. 
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Target Firm’s Characteristics:  
c) Characteristics of the target firm should also influence acquisition outcomes. 
We theorized in the hypotheses development section that international acquisition 
strategies involve an inherent liability of foreignness (Zaheer 1995). Thus, cross-border 
targets are particularly difficult to evaluate prior to acquisition and integrate post-
acquisition. We control for this possibility of Foreign Targets (CV3) through a binary 
variable. If the target firm is from the United States then it is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. 
d) Since our sample includes both publicly traded and privately owned target 
firms, to enhance the generalizability of our findings, we included a variable as to 
whether the target is a Public Target (CV4), coded as 1 if the target is publicly listed and 
0 otherwise (Dikova et al., 2010; Zaheer, et al., 2010). 
Deal Characteristics:  
We also used a number of deal specific control variables:  
e) Acquisition Deal Attitude (CV5): Hostile and competitive acquisitions invoke 
various types of pre-acquisition and post-integration resistance from the target firm’s 
management. If the deal attitude is friendly we coded this variable to be 1, otherwise, 0. 
f) Relative size (CV6) of the target and acquirer:  Prior studies have provided 
ample evidence that the relative sizes of a target and an acquirer affect acquisition 
outcomes. This variable is calculated as the ratio of a target firm’s total assets and an 
acquiring firm’s total assets (Haleblian, et al., 2006).  
Finally, we used binary variables to control for differences in year specific and 
industry-based (SIC codes) market variations. We then analyzed the data using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The descriptive statistics, i.e., mean, standard deviations, and bivariate correlation 
estimates for our measures are presented, respectively, in Table 1 and Table 2. Evaluation 
of the correlation matrix reveals that there are no significantly high correlations among 
the variables of the study that could confound results due to multicollinearity leading to 
variance inflation. Our results made it evident that among the explanatory and the control 
variables, none of the variance inflation factors (VIF) exceeded the conventionally 
followed cutoff limit of 10 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Netter, 2004; Kleinbaum, Kupper, 
and Muller, 1988). More specifically, the VIF estimates of all the variables used in our 
study were below 9.85, suggesting that there was no significant threat of multicollinearity 
in our model.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of OLS regression analyses applied to test each of the 
hypotheses involving the change in accounting performance of the focal acquirer. Model 
I is a baseline specification that includes all of the control variables, Model II 
incorporates acquiring firm’s alliance experience terms, and Model III and IV include 
acquirer’s prior alliance experience in target’s industry and experience in target’s nation, 
respectively. Furthermore, Model V introduces the moderating variables, i.e., acquiring 
firm’s acquisition experience and its interactive effects in the same equation with the 
previously included independent variables to test the three baseline hypotheses.  
 
In the first hypothesis, we anticipated that prior and recent alliance experience of 
an acquirer will positively relate to its acquisition experience. The empirical analyses 
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provided no statistically significant support for the hypothesized effects of indicating that 
recent alliance experience of the acquirer has no direct, linear effect on the change in 
return on equity (ROE) of the acquirer.  In other words, organizational learning at the 
alliance program level may not have any substantial implications for acquisition 
performance. In the second hypothesis, we predicted that an acquirer’s prior alliance 
experience in a future target’s industry will positively be associated with its change in 
ROE over a window of 3 years. We did not find a statistical support for H2. Both of these 
hypotheses were built on the arguments of declarative and procedural memory.  
Our third hypotheses expected a positive association between an acquirer’s prior 
alliance experience in the target’s firm’s country location and its superior acquisition 
performance. This hypothesis drew on the arguments of the difficulties of inter-
organizational interactions and transactions at a cross-border setting. Consistent with our 
arguments, we find statistical significance in favor of H3 (p<0.05). The results 
underscore the importance of country specific transactive memory, albeit in an alliance 
context, for the improvement of acquisition performance.  
In light of the arguments on the relatedness between the task and processes of 
alliances and acquisitions, we made several predictions involving acquirer’s prior 
acquisition experience at the program level. Contrary to our expectations and previously 
conducted studies, H4 was not found statistically significant for our sample of US 
acquirers. This suggested a lack of association between acquirer’s prior and recent 
acquisition experience and enhanced acquisition performance. In addition, when we 
tested for the moderating role of an acquirer’s prior acquisition experience on the initially 
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stated relationship in our baseline hypotheses concerning various types of alliance 
experience and acquisition performance, we find some support.  
In view of the moderator, quite contrary to prior findings on acquirer acquisition 
experience, in the full and final model (Model IV) we find no statistical support for the 
main effect of this variable for acquisition performance. However, we found that it 
interacts with industry- and nation-specific prior alliance experience, albeit in the 
direction contrary to our expectation. However, considering the directionality of our 
prediction we did not find statistical support for H4a, H4b, and H4c. In all three of the 
cases, the interaction terms supported a negative association with our dependent variable. 
This confirms a weakening effect of acquirer’s acquisition experience on the positive 
relationship between prior industry- and nation- related alliance experience. Possible 
explanation for this inconsistency may be attributable to the ideas that managers of 
acquiring firms: a) may either be falling into “competency traps” by acting rather 
aggressively while making meaning of their prior related experience in two related, yet 
different tasks, and/or, b) may not be recognizing the underlying differences in alliances 
and acquisitions, and are over-generalizing while applying their routines and learning in 
two different contexts.  
The overall results of our analyses empirically support our overarching theoretical 
arguments. Specifically, the analyses offer general support for our hypotheses that drew 
on how various types of declarative, procedural, and transactive dimensions of 
organizational memory determine the transfer of learning given some relatedness and 
difference of tasks in an inter-dependent setting. In both of these cases, we found no 
support for the hypotheses H4a, H4b, and H4c).  
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In line with findings in previous studies on prior alliance experience, we were 
unable to find empirical support for the relationship between general alliance experience 
and acquisition experience, even after considering only the recent experience. But, 
interestingly, and consistent with our prediction, the results confirm the relevance of 
related experience in industry and national contexts for facilitating the transfer effects of 
learning in a multi-task setting. One possible explanation for the inconsistency in our 
predictions and empirical findings for the unsupported hypotheses may be attributable to 
the arguments that managers of acquiring firms: a) may be falling into “competency 
traps” and aggressively applying their prior alliance experience related experience during 
post-acquisition phase which, albeit similar, requires a vast set of skills and experience 
due to the post-acquisition integration, and/or, b) may not be recognizing the underlying 
differences in alliances and acquisitions, and are erroneously over-generalizing based on 
their learning in alliances to apply their routines in an acquisition context.  
More importantly, empirical results for the H3 supports the explanation that 
related prior experience, routine, and preparedness in targets’ country context developed 
though an acquirer’s recent alliance experience beyond partner/target-specific experience, 
help to create certain types of useful memory to facilitate a superior acquisition 
performance. This finding adds further explanations to the vast body of literature that 
examines acquisition success/failure. It also extends the streams of literature on alliance 
portfolio and acquisition program perspective that explain performance outcomes of these 
activities in a cross-form setting of organizational learning.  
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LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 Like any other study, ours has a number of limitations which, if carefully crafted, 
may be addressed in future endeavors. For instance, we did not explicitly measure post-
formation management processes in the context of alliances or acquisitions. Future 
research could improve upon this, also incorporating other dimensions that can affect the 
transfer process such as decision-making speed, the structure of project management 
teams, communication processes, and so forth to compare both the tasks of alliance and 
acquisition. In addition, since we focus on announced deals based on publicly available 
data, we are unable to capture the actual routine involved in the process. As a result, 
drawing on previous empirical studies, we used a number of proxies to operationalize our 
variables. Further studies using case-based and survey-based method may provide further 
understanding of these learning outcomes. As with other well-published studies, despite 
the prevalent use and richness of SDC Platinum database for strategic alliance research, 
our empirical results may be somewhat limited by occasional coding error given the 
reporting standards and availability of data points (Schilliing, 2009). Furthermore, we 
used only accounting based measures to quantify acquisition performance. Future studies 
may use an ex ante performance measure (CAR) from the stock market reactions to 
further support the results. Given the inconclusive evidence in favor of the relevance of 
acquirer’s prior alliance experience for acquisition performance, it may make sense to 
explore various characteristics of alliances (e.g., depth, breadth, or patterns of alliance 
formation) to further examine this relationship between alliance experience and 
acquisition performance.  Lastly, the results of this study should be generalized with 
caution, since our sample includes completed acquisitions by only US firms.  
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Our results have three broad managerial implications. First, our empirical results 
generally confirm that a future acquirer’s prior involvement in specific types of strategic 
alliances can enhance its acquisition performance. In other words, a generalized corporate 
development capability (Zaheer et al., 2010; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) may not ensure a 
positive experience spillover between alliances and acquisitions in general. However, 
from an information-processing and specialization standpoint, decision-makers of a firm 
would greatly benefit from relevant alliance experience, given certain learning conditions 
are met. For instance, alliance experience can be particularly helpful for the success of 
acquisitions in some well-defined and familiar contexts (i.e., in certain industries and 
nations) as we identify. Second, our results suggest that managers would benefit if they 
complement their experience in on task (alliances) by drawing on their experience in 
other related tasks (acquisitions), especially when the contexts of learning are similar to 
encourage positive transfer effects of learning. In other words, managers need to be 
careful of inadvertently or inappropriately generalizing from prior alliance experiences to 
the management of their acquisition activities. 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
Overall, this study attempted to contribute to corporate development activities 
literature by theorizing on the implications of experience, memory, routine, and learning 
in a multi-task and interdependent learning context. Building on recent studies (Zollo and 
Reuer, 2010; Zaheer, Hernandez, and Banerjee, 2010; Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz, and 
Croson, 2012) that integrated the research streams of alliance and acquisition activities, we 
attempted to inform our understanding of acquisition performance by theorizing on the 
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dimensions of memory and learning mechanisms that are mutually inclusive for the tasks 
of alliance and acquisition. Since extant studies investigated acquisition-related properties 
and alliance properties at the dyad level result in superior acquisition performance, we 
contribute to this research stream by considering the effects of accumulated learning in 
related tasks and contexts for superior performance in a cross-form setting. In other 
words, we particularly highlighted the importance of the relevance and the elements of 
learning (Thorndike 1960; Gagne, 1966) at the alliance program level (i.e., cumulative 
learning from alliance). This enables us to recognize how experience gained in a firm’s 
alliance portfolio may positively relate to a focal firm’s acquisition performance. 
Therefore, this study makes the following contributions: 
a) Developing a further expansive theory regarding understanding the effective 
management of acquisitions. 
b) Recognizing that given certain dimensions of relatedness, organizational learning 
based on the alliance program/portfolio is transferrable in a multi-task setting. 
c) Emphasizing the relevance of procedural, declarative, and transactive memory 
dimensions (Thorndike 1960; Gagne, 1966) for a superior transfer effect of 
learning in a multi-task setting. 
d) Underscoring the depth, e.g., specialization of learning, exploitation matters 
greatly to learning spillovers across corporate activities, especially when 
complemented by breadth, e.g., diversity of learning, exploration (March, 1991, 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).  
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DISSERTATION CONCLUSION 
With a view to understand the interdependencies of corporate-level strategic activities, 
this dissertation took an integrative approach and conducted two empirical studies 
synthesizing alliance and acquisition research. Study I analyzed alliance and acquisition 
research using a relational and dyadic framework to understand the corporate strategy of 
future target selection. Study II integrated alliance portfolio research and acquisition program 
perspectives for a organizational level of analysis vis-à-vis an activity based learning to 
examine corporate-level acquisition performance. Overall, this dissertation attempted a step 
toward taking stock of a vast body of extant research in two parallel streams to extend our 
understanding from a broader corporate development perspective. As the field of strategic 
management matures, given last 5 decades of rich scholarship, this new domain of cross-
stream studies promises to open further avenues of research for a holistic understanding of 
multinational corporations’ strategy and performance.  
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FIGURE 1: OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 - STUDY I: CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE STUDY 
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FIGURE 3 - STUDY II: CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE STUDY 
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TABLE 1 - STUDY I: CORRELATIONS ESTIMATES FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION  
 
 Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
[1] Acquisition Attempt 1 
 
[2] Prior partnership -0.0791 1 
 
[3] Multi-nationality 0.2107 -0.0132 1 
[4] Organizational Type 
Difference -0.0595 0.0645 -0.0519 1 
 
[5] Intangibility -0.1787 0.0292 -0.0414 0.0792 1 
[6] Prior acquisition 
experience 0.0457 -0.0079 0.0468 -0.0146 -0.0098 1 
[7] Prior alliance experience -0.0303 0.1409 0.0101 0.0554 0.062 0.256 1 
[8] Number of alliance 
partners -0.1986 0.0337 -0.1033 -0.1219 -0.0432 -0.044 -0.0456 1 
[9] Target attractiveness 0.0461 -0.0056 0.0483 -0.0135 -0.0087 0.9989 0.275 -0.0456 1 
[10] Acquirer’s Public 
Status -0.0282 0.0466 -0.0096 -0.0356 0.1734 -0.027 0.0987 -0.0654 -0.0265 1 
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TABLE 2 - STUDY I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Prior partnership 0.009 0.097
Multi-nationality 0.591 0.491
Ownership type difference 0.512 0.499
Intangibility 0.909 0.287
Prior acquisition experience 4.184 29.3
Prior alliance experience 6.308 18.640
Number of alliance partners 8.406 23.192
Target attractiveness 4.095 10.475
Acquirer’s public status 
 
7.543 21.583
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TABLE 3 - STUDY I: ESTIMATES FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
CV1 Prior alliance experience  -0.00872** -0.00972*** -0.00929** -0.00870*** -0.00741***  
 
(0.000517) (0.000514) (0.000514) (0.000512) (0.000522)  
CV2 Number of alliance partners -1.173** -1.206*** -1.294*** -1.252** -1.183***  
 
(0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0331) (0.0326) (0.0337)  
CV3 Acquirer’s Public Status -0.289** -0.304*** -0.233*** -0.214** -0.103***  
 
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0262)  
CV4 Prior acquisition experience  -2.91e-05** -2.94e-05*** -2.95e-05** -2.82e-05*** -2.23e-05***  
 
(3.12e-06) (3.09e-06) (3.13e-06) (3.07e-06) (2.97e-06)  
CV5 Target attractiveness 0.00869** 0.00878*** 0.00881** 0.00843*** 0.00665***  
 
(0.000908) (0.000901) (0.000911) (0.000895) (0.000862)  
H1 Prior partnership  -3.369**    -3.238***  
 
(0.271)    (0.272)  
H2 Multi-nationality  -0.470***   -0.680***  
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 (0.0419)   (0.114)  
H3 Ownership Type Difference   -0.419**  -0.308***  
 
  (0.0210)  (0.0217)  
H4 Intangibility    -1.113** -1.045***  
 
   (0.0453) (0.0466)  
Constant 1.785** 1.847*** 2.089** 2.838** 1.637***  
 
(0.0698) (0.0700) (0.0716) (0.0820) (0.0621)  
Observations 43,469 43,469 43,469 43,469 43,469  
chi-square  4664 4171 4571 4825 4583  
 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Year binary variables included. 
Note: N = 43,469. (*) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.05; (**) less than 0.01; (***) less than 0.001 
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TABLE 1 - STUDY II: CORRELATIONS ESTIMATES 
 Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
[1] Acquisition performance 1
 
[2] Acquirer size 0.0028 1
 
[3] Acquirer’s debt to equity 
ratio -0.0165 0.1004
 
1
 
[4] Foreign targets -0.0021 0.2479 0.2922
 
1
 
[5] Public target 0.0022 0.0056 0.4271 0.379 1 
[6] Deal attitude 
0.0037 -0.0116 -0.0351 -0.0253 -0.0035 1
[7] Relative size 0.0157 -0.0021 -0.0192 -0.018 -0.0108 0.0004        1 
[8] Prior alliance experience -0.0029 0.029 0.0862 0.0683 0.0412 
-
0.0068 0.001 1
[9] Alliance experience in 
Target’s Industry 0.0002 0.1476 0.294 0.3224 0.2208 
-
0.0195 0.1044 0.1154 1
 
[10] Alliance experience in 
Target’s Nation -0.0056 0.0058 -0.0512 -0.0368 -0.0223 0.0033 0.0446 0.0177 -0.0049 1
 
[11] Acquirer’s acquisition 
experience -0.0023 -0.0122 -0.0304 -0.0575 0.0278 0.0034
-
0.0035 -0.0488 -0.0831 -0.0022 1 
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TABLE 2 - STUDY II: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Acquisition performance -0.133 189.860
Acquirer size 6.835 2.289
Acquirer’s debt to equity ratio 2.443 13.188
Foreign targets 0.175 0.380
Public target 0.127 0.333
Deal attitude 0.946 0.226
Relative size 0.386 3.839
Prior alliance experience 8.406 23.192
Alliance experience in Target’s 
Industry 
4.095 10.475
 
Alliance experience in Target’s 
Nation 
7.543 21.583
 
Acquirer’s acquisition experience 9.609 20.409
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TABLE 3 - STUDY II: ESTIMATES FROM ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ANALYSES 
 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
CV1 Acquirer size 0.0801 -5.442* -5.419* -5.364* -5.361*  
 
(0.141) (2.931) (2.940) (2.949) (2.967)  
CV2 Acquirer’s debt to equity 
ratio 
5.871*** 24.22** 24.51** 24.41** 24.43**  
 
(1.721) (10.90) (10.94) (10.97) (11.08)  
CV3 Foreign targets 14.72* 50.95 47.79 50.68 50.77  
 
(8.001) (71.61) (72.08) (72.38) (72.97)  
CV4 Public target -0.503 -13.01 -12.61 -12.80 -12.81  
 
(3.597) (17.62) (17.69) (17.74) (17.84)  
CV5 Deal attitude 0.0108 -0.625 -1.758 -5.635 -5.634  
 
(0.243) (11.03) (11.27) (12.69) (12.74)  
CV6 Relative size -1.341 61.39* 64.29* 61.48* 61.79 
 
 
(2.672) (34.42) (34.95) (35.29) (41.52)  
 
3.703 -4.640 -4.408 -4.650 -4.647  
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0.0801 -5.442* -5.419* -5.364* -5.361*  
H1 Acquirer’s alliance  
experience (AALE) 
 -0.243 -0.296 -0.291 -0.291  
 
 (0.174) (0.201) (0.202) (0.203)  
H2 Alliance experience in  
target’s Industry (AETI) 
 9.215 8.542 12.94 12.95  
 
 (11.47) (11.57) (13.31) (13.42)  
H3 Alliance experience in  
target’s nation (AETN) 
 61.09*** 62.42*** 59.83** 59.74**  
 
 (23.11) (23.32) (23.69) (24.53)  
H4 Acquirer’s acquisition 
experience (AACE) 
 0.116 -0.0187 0.123 0.104  
 
 (0.201) (0.324) (0.387) (1.376)  
H4a AALE*AACE    
 
 0.00128 0.00122 0.00122  
H4b AETI*AACE  (0.00242) (0.00242) (0.00244)  
 
 -0.160 -0.160  
H4c AETN*AACE  (0.238) (0.239)  
 
 0.0197  
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Constant -43.92*** -213.3** -212.3** -213.0** -213.1**  
 
(12.90) (77.47) (78.76) (79.84) (80.24)  
      
Observations 5,396 314 314 314 314  
R-squared 0.011 0.295 0.297 0.300 0.300  
 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Year variables included. Year and industry binary variables included. 
Note: N = 5,396. (*) Indicates a significance level of less than 0.1; (**) less than 0.05; (***) less than 0.01 
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